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Conduct, Performance, and Pllblic R:>licy Implications
of Baseball's
This paper examines issues
between baseball's
relationship
standpoint

reentry

baseball

of baseball's

unaffected

draft

of public policy,

and league balance.

literature,

significant

points

the conventional

prediction

rationale

aspects

perhaps less so.
titive

effects

lt:>ore [1981].

affect

fran the

canpetitiveness

in light

of the sport's

that

for baseball's

clearly

in the

team balance will

be

the issues of baseball's
of the sport.

labor market.

Section III presents

touch briefly

draft

This sunmary serves

model which are sound fran those

In Section II we extend an alternative
reentry

We

favored

exemption and then review the salient

of the traditional

of baseball's

impli-

has not been tested.

in the econanic model of baseball's

to distinguish

First,

labor market have been set forth . quite

and the econanic analysis

on the proffered

of this

inmunity. 1 second, though the redistributive

by the reentry draft

status

the link

The character

events which potentially

Section I provides background relating
antitrust

regarding

t11,1Q
broad respects.

are especially

rather curious antitrust

econanic

of theory and evidence

is imI;X>rtant in at least

in professional

cations

Reentry Draft

originally

and estimates

theory of the canpesuggested

an empirical

by Daly

&

model designed

1saseball's
inmunity stems rather circuitously
fran the 1914 New York Supreme
Court interpretation
in .American League Baseball Club v. Chase. The basis
for the court's
judgment was that professional
baseball at that time did
not qualify as "a ccmrodity or an article
of merchandise subject to the
regulation of Congress on the theory that it is interstate
carmerce".
Cespite
several mitigating developnents since then, the Courts have shown that they
will rule in favor of baseball's
exemption until Congress acts explicitly
to revoke it.
Congressional inquiry into this prospect was undertaken by
the Sisk Comtittee as recently .as 1976.
Though the · carmittee' s findings
failed to justify
baseball's
exemption, no formal action was taken.
For
a IT'Oredetailed account of the judicial history, see Markham & Teplitz
( 1981, pp. 1-9).
1

to test

important

the policy

tenets

of the alternative

significance

of our findings

theory.

Section

and SUJgests

directions

discusses

N

for further

research.
I. Background & Review
Broadly
that

speaking,

the explicit

necessary

league agreements

to preserve

viability,

the

negotiated

broadcasting

revenue,

such seeming cartel

contracts,
control

monopoly.

The rules

governing

defended

as

For example,

each year's

1,,0rst teams the first

with

AlthoUJh

their
this

original

thus artificially

suppresses

can be especially
these

varied

vital

respects

breach of antitrus
integrity,

system

a period
canpetitive

in preserving
it

are necessary

the general

restraints
draft

vitality

players

fonnal

of

to give

rurthermore,

are obligated
by the

and

this cost-saving
clubs.

agreements

clearly

team balance,

canpetition

to

leag ue.

on new talent,

extramarginal

to assure

of

on player

is intended

superstars,

has been argued .that

right

labor market are even

bidding

otherwise

attendance

the

standardized

the cost of potential

t guidelines

and thus

for

limits

the sport's

are

as jointly

for sharing

new "canpetitors"

contracts,

status

arrangements

foonulas

contend

of fina!lcial

on the best new talent.

in rookie
club

legal

For purposes

rookie

option

exemption

unique

"pro-canpetitive"

the reverse-order

clause"

draft

intricate
in granting

mobility.

stay

by its

requires

league

the "reserve

afforded

of canpetition.

controversial,

throUJh

antitrust

the vitality

and canplete

territorial
more

defende rs of baseball's

in our

In
in

financial
national

pastime.
In rather
untenable,

sharp contrast,

especially

econanic

the notion

that

analysis
the reserve
2

finds rrost of these argunents
clause

has pro-canpetitive

implications.
original

reserve

alterin;;1
for

The traditional

the

.

conditions
that
clubs

allocation

are

the property

via

initial

the reserve

protected

market.

clause

clearly

predicted

since

the creation

in an auction

with

of players

the econanic

escalation

of the reentry

draft

in player
in 1976.

3

market
market

a provision
Second,

a club receives

low cost

personnel.

wroUJht in the rookie

draft,

owners are in a p:>sition
throUJh

the tox office

model has

as simply a rent-seekin;;J • arranganent.
the dramatic

t\oiO laoor

for players,

either

the

or waive players.

trade,

clause,

of

without

the owners.

fran relatively

assignments

In short,

fran

it is essentially

bidding

under the reserve
rents

follows

to sell,

received

terms

would prevail

to playertalent
free

the

exploitation,

First,

no canpetitive

the revenue

the econanic

the cash-player

rights

property-right

and subsequently
to extract

clause.

that

monoposonistic

argument

unilaterally

is initially

rents

Given the

that

The CCX]ency of this

nonetheless

Since there
econanic

of talent

implied by the reserve

secures

view holds

clause merely facilitated

2

players.

econanic

salaries

long
Indeed,

or

identified
the model

that has occurred

The unprecedented

contracts

2The seminal discussion
of this issue is Rottenberg's
(1956, pp. 247-252).
More formal treatments
are presented
by Quirk & El Hodiri (1971) and [Ermert
(1973).
A concise
reveiw of the literature
on this p:>int is provided by
Daly & Moore (1981, pp. 78-79).
3~ should emphasis that the re-entry
draft
represents
a revision,
not a
repeal,
of the reserve
clause.
Originally,
the reserve
clause assigned
the property
rights of a player to the team for the duration of the players
professional
career.
The only real option for a disgruntled
player prior
to 1976 was to leave baseball
for a season, after
which time the player
was free to negotiate
with any club.
This option was in fact taken by curt
Flood in 1970 following an unfavorable
U. s. Supreme Court ruling on Flood's
appeal on the legality
of the reserve clause.
1he basis for this decision
was baseball's
antitrust
exemption.
Under the revised
reserve
clause,
a
player is only obligated
to his original
team for six years.
Then the player
is eligible
for the re-entry draft.
3

negotiated

since

time reflect °'the redistribution
of econanic rent fran
.
4
club owners to players.
However, regarding the net reallocation
of players,
the econanic
contract

that

reasoning

as generated

to sell

that

player

Though the

is that

in the free-agent
at a canparable

free-agent

market

with management's

decision,

the reentry

is predicted

draft

and thus team balance
¼hether

literature.

and

question

perfonnance

free-agent

market.

respects.

First,

majority

designation

an alternative

Daly

&

Moore (1981) .

reserve

the profitability
the calculus.
econanic

in fact

rents,

clause.

associated

For this

reason,

but not tale .nt,

correlated
these

with

player

findings

reflects

those preliminary

view of the reentry
The next section

(1984) which,

in team revenue
rqovanents

as preliminary

performed is a univariate

Second , the ordinal

c lassi fications

. Nevertheless,

in the econcmic

found improvements

for any of the other variables

performance.
quality

neglected

paper by D::>lan& Schnidt

prediction,

positively

reentry market

by the

been unaltered

the Spearman rank procedure

broad

with

to redistribute

However, we regard

team revenue and field
three

changes

is a recent

ology which does not control

within

premiun under the original

clearly

new

should have been quite willing

which has been relatively

to the traditional

field

to match a playe r's

should be unaffected.

An exception

contrary

market,

it does not alter

team balance·has

is an empirical

an owner unwilling

draft's

surnnarizes

the

in two
method-

that might explain

ranking of free-agents
a subjective,
findings

implications
this

in

albeit

are consistent
suggested

by

view and then extends

4
The prediction
of monopsonistic
exploitation
has been amply verified
in
the literature.
Estimates of the rate of exploitation
under the reserve
Empirical
estimates
of the degree
clause are obtained
by Scully ( 1974).
of rent redistribution
since the re-entry
draft
are provided by Cassing
& D::>uglas (1981), Sarrners & Quinton (1982), and Hill & Spellman (1983).
4

the

analysis

canpetitive

to obtain

new short-

implications

of the reentry

II.

As indicated

player

Theoretical

above, a crucial

model is the assumption
.throt.gh

the reverse-order
transactions.

rookie

Moore (hereafter

cally,

and thus

examining
D

link

in the prediction

question

M's reformulation

the

draft

allocation

of talent

\o.Ould be ultimately

prior

deals

draft.

impacts of the reentry

draft.

by Cemnert

6

{1973),

historimodel

for

5
that

However, they reject
that

should

However, Daly

traditional

£ran the carrnon pranise

wealth of the league.

as discussed

of the

achieved

undone via cash-

cash-player

to the reentry

appropriateness

proceeds

the

of the traditional

D & M) cite an apparent dearth of such transactions

enhance the aggregate
proposition,

regarding

Reconsiderations

'Ihis ¼Ould seem to imply that

the canpetitive
&

predictions

draft.

that any pro-canpetitive

have been ccmnon, if not rampant,
&

and long-run

efforts

close

races

the related

to capture

the

5111\ccording to press accounts,
prior to 1976 and the prospective
revision
of the reserve clause, few, if any, players of star quality had been exchanged
for cash since \~rld war II.
In deed , the Corrnissioner of Baseball's
nullification of a nunber of player sales by the oakland franchise
in 1976, subsequently upheld by the courts,
was explicitly
based on the rationale
that
they were highly unusual and \o.Ould reduce the equality
of canpetition •••• In
short, casual empiricism {probably the best evidence we have) su;:igests that
player- cash transfers
are not the medium throt.gh which significant
increments
of talent
are transacted •••. this custan raises
serious questions
about the
descriptive
or predictive
accuracy of the conventional
model for analyzing
changes in the rules structure."
{D & M, pp. 83-84)

6

eognizance of this point is manifest in the league policy of splitting
gate
receipts
between hane and road clubs.
Ho\o.ever, perhaps of greater significance
is the role of national broadcasting
contracts.
These are negotiated
jointly
and shared equally . It is reasonable to prestrne that the value of the national
contracts
will depend on the level of national interest
in the sport, sanething
which is likely
to vary direcly
with the vigor of canpetiton.
Hence, in
terms of national
broadcasting
revenue, all teams have an equal interest
in league balance.
5

joint

benefits

of league balance are necessarily thwarted for reasons endemic
7
externality problem.
Instead, they stress special attributes

to the typical
of Baseball's

envirorment which raise

wealth effects

can be internalized.

the liklehcx:x:l that significant
This unique setting

is forcefully

.external
descibed ·

by D & M:
" •••• team owners are surely aware of these (wealth) effects; the
nunber of teams is not large and, hence, free-rider
effects are
not inevitable;
a central organization
( the league) is available
to coordinate activities
and prescibe allocative
rules; collusion
anong teams is, uniguely, legal in the industry and detect ion of
violators of collusive agreements remarkably easy." (pp. 81-82)
Considered
draft

in this

more, it

the collective

facilitating

if the initial

recognized
league,

implicit

that

with team balance.

Further-

such agreeroents be explicit

in light

structure.

of players

rendered

Henc~, it is plausible
in the rookie draft

step toward wealth-maximizing

contract

could be binding.

rookie

of how league rules are devised

associated

institutional

as a significant

deals

terms of the reverse-order

instance

benefits

allocation

then an implicit

player

clear

is not even imperative

of baseball's

prior

the explicit

can be seen as a rather

to incorporate

that

context,

balance

not to undermine that allocation
Indeed,

D

&

M maintain

that

just

is

for the
via cashsuch an

"no sale" agreement was a rather well-known and time-honored tradition

to revision

of the the reserve

clause in 1976. 8

7111he situation

is analogous to the traditional
production externality
problem. '!he improvement of a better than average team results in diseconanies ·
which• are external to t he club but internal to the league.
Likewise, the
improvement of a poor team results in benefits to the league as a whole over
and above those which accrue to that individual club. It can not be expected
that the club wil l consider these ext ernal effec ts of its decisions in determining the level of ~ts team's quality" (Demnert 1973, p. 29).
8oa1y & t-bore (1981. p. 82-83), especially
6

notes 5, 7, and 8.

In sum, the conspicuous absense of cash-player
reflect

the effectiveness

....ork to internalize
league balance .

with which league rules,

the collective
However, it

is also

likely

described

above.

canmented that the crucial
the perceived

benefits

implementation.
with respect

conclusion

by several

erosion of an apparent

salary

contracts

structure

incentive

contractual

of our ea rlier

cooperation

while raising

paper,

we

clubs

the intensity

in the ree ntry draft

custan.

slipstream

of bidding

testifies

to sane

effect

on base.ball's

to the findings

of our earlier

perfonnance correlated

fran 1977-198.3.

for the reasons cited

for an individual

of

Second, it is _note\toOrthy that the

Third, accordirg

talent

the costs

findings or observations

improvements in revenue and field

finding as preliminary

Still,

a major rule change such

shock to the implicit

have had a significant

with the movrnent of free-agent

free-agent

that

is based on several

"no-sale"

in general.

paper, measureable

a profit

with greater

to the [X)st reentry draft pericx:1. First,

on premier players

free-agent

identified

of the reentry draft may have been to reduce

of implicit

~is

and implicit,

In the conclusions

effect

to 1976 may

both explicit

wealth effects

as the reentry draft could be a destabilizirg
envirorment

deals prior

Thm.gh we regard this

in Section

tean to explore

I , it does indicate
the prospects

of the

input market.
these points alone do not undetmine an arguably powerful rationale
!

that the owners \toOuldstill
to abstain

f ran the financial

way that cash-player
has apparently
effect

be collectively

better

off if they simply agreed

fray of the free agent market , much in the

deals had been eschewed in the past.

not been implemented leads us to hypothesize

of a well-organized

may have been to raise

auction

That this

that the crucial

market for proven major league

the cost of detection
7

policy

talent

and enforcement of an implicit

agreenent.

'Ihis concept

represents

model and can be develped
the short and long-run

more fully

implications

In our view, the reentry
it

lends a greater

in this

setting

of implicit

a cash-player

a seller's

standpoint,

transaction

rather

intractable.

their option

to view the successful
an implicit

alter

it

perception

field

is the extra

balance.

pennant and merely contending

Players
is also

it is inappro-

In sun, it

an agreenent

is hard

without means

more prone to violation.

likelihood

since

that

context

the reentry

draft

can be interpreted

the t'tA'.) are highly correlatect.

canes with winning,

might make the difference
for one,

Fran

when the raid ceases to be a clear

Balance in this

revenue that

draft

event.

decision.

with a player,

and consequently

performance,

a free-agent

the reentry

make, and when as many as

theory predicts,

su:_Jgests an increased

canpetitive

that

agreenent

cartel

is less enforceable

as revenue and/or
Indeed,

As

to negotiate

Anon:x'ftlity

blame among clubs

bidder as wholly culpable.

anti~raid

transaction.

This analysis

danand side,

because

and thus enforcement

In essence,

Cne bid does not an auction

a dozen clubs exercise

of detection

.

transactions.

fran a two- to a multi-party

On the

regarding

disruptive

it is quite simply no longer a club's

to be free-agents.

two-party

is potentially

9

M

&

draft.

it makes detection

more difficult.

decide

will

player draft

of the D

new predictions

of the reentry

is important since

agreements

to enforce

to render

extension

degree of anonymity to player

elevates

priate

an interesting

that

10

coupled with the
between winning

poses the initial

incentive

a
to

91he general significance
of these points for effective
collusive
conduct
w~s discussed by Stigler (1968) and are well accepted in the literature.
lOFor example, Scully' s revenue model predicts
for a club playing .500 versus .600 baseball
dollars (1974, pp. 920-921).
8

that the financial implication
is more than one million 1972

defect.

Here again the analysis
must be sufficient

there
it

is

necessary

free-agent
this

to

relationship

the short-run
be affected,

yields

a collusive

is largely

agreenent,

implicit

i;x,ints.

First

are the legality
the

of all,

in the si;:ort

in general.

rel evant

in determining

national

draft,

will

dimension

of a pre-1976

implicit

case.

Although

11For example, Hunt & Lewis (1976,
behind the leader to be significant
attendance.

efforts

there

for

to restrike
this

hyothesis

of the league arrange-

league.
revenue,
effect

but may heighten
can be especially
the

context,

contract

the team balance

Close can.petitions

contracts,

are

which we

The ti,.,o most significant

the

setting.

Estima.tion

implcations

and the fact

In a more theoretical

SLIT\,

impacts

performances.

This latter

play out in a multi-period
in this

intact.

broadcasting

In

·of

III.

of attendence
11

which

are rneasureable

imi;:ortant facets

for

role

should

The basis

collusion

reason,

canpetition

has longer-run

ranain

predictor

equally .

and field

strategy

interest

any disruption

the

to cheat.

model is that
and evidence

theory

The strength

incentive

or explicit.

of explicit

wealth-maximizing

which are shared

of

we i,.,ould anticipate

cooperation

are not only a significant

that

of the

also

Generally,

ment which encourage

remains

of cartel
For this

assessment

the focus of Section

perspective

briely.

several

of these

sane measure

on team revenue

theoretical

develop

tenet

defectors.

preliminary

of the alternative

activity

effects

canbines

to entice

for which both the motivation

This
should

our

an established

may have had on team performances.

prediction

of free-agent
of these

rewards

refine

movanents

broaches

reve~ues

fran

we also emphasize

due to the

free-agent

Time adds a very important
always

individual

incentives

pp. 937-938) found the number of games
in explaining
a team's hone and road

9

to cheat
quences

on a collusive

in

so. 12

of doing

the well-known

than
the

longer-run

reinstate

prior

rationale

prediction

a policy

this

with

the lessons . afforded
the

there

dilemna" •

setting

undennine

existed

Indeed,

"prisoners'

a single-trial

contrast,

agreement,

predictable

is the point
13

will

action.

Indeed,

conveyed

be taken

prisoners.

by league

contract

one sign

that

in

is most vexing

Therefore,

"no sale"

the implicit
draft.

between

conse-

of the game reinforce

collective
steps

joint

so ccgently

However, the dilemna

by repetitions

that

to the reentry

also

no cannunication

for

paralleling

are

In
rather

we of fer
members to

that apparently
league

sentiments

to this effect may have already surfaced is the issue of team ccmpensation
for

players

issue

in the

behind the player

speaking,
should

lost

strike

manifestations
appear

market.
concluding

Further

in the

reentry

process.

Recall

which interrupted

of any renewed league
nature

consideration

and intensity
of this

that

this

was a critical

the 1981 season.
agreement

in the longer

of activity

long-run

Generally

in the

hypothesis

free

is given

term
agent
in our

ccmnents.

12 For a concise

graphical

treatment

13For a detailed
discussion
& Raiffa (1957, pp. 94-102).

of this point,

of this

see Asch (1983, pp. 61-63) •

game and related
10

extensions,

see Luce

III.
This section

The Empirical Model and Results

presents

changes in ccrnpetitive

an empirical

framework within which to test

for

bet\>.€en pre- and post-reentry
draft eras,
1969-76 and 1977-83 respectively. 14
Changes in canpeti ton as they relate
to free-agent

enue.

novments are assessed

In a purely

(REV) is derived
( l)

where

balance

accounting

in tenns of affects

sense,

fran five potential

on teams' total

an individual
sources: 15

team's

rev-

annual revenue

REV = !J.FEv + CREV + BREVL + BREVN+ POSTREV;
AREV

attendance

CREV

concessions revenue,

=
=
=
BREVL
=
BREVN
POSTREV =

This identity

revenue,

local broadcast revenue,
shared national broadcast revenue, and
p:,st-season attendance and concessions revenue.

serves

a useful

organizational

fran is accounting

function

per se.

and to what extent,

a revenue incentive

purpose quite

separate

is discerning

whether,

our objective
exists

for owners to bid in the free-

agent market.

For this reason, we may :irrmediately ignore sane of the revenue

sources listed

in equation

(1 ) .

is shared equally each year.
the distribution

of this

For example, national

Hence, free-agent

activity

revenue ccrnponent across

broadcastin;J

revenue

will in no way alter

teams.

ve also exclt.de

141969-76 provides an eight-year time span canparable in duration to the seven
These fifteen
seasons since the inception of the reentry draft (1977-83).
years mark the full history of baseball since the sport reorganized into
four divisions.
A minor canplication of the period is the introduction of
two new teams, Seattle and Toronto, for the 1977 season.
For consistency,
we have dropped these teams fran our sample and have recalculated
all winning
percentages in terms of the original 24 teams.
15These revenue figures are closely guarded by many of the teams. The manner
and success of our revenue estimation are described in detail in tolan and
SChnidt, 1984.
11

J:X)St-season revenue fran consideration,

but for a more interesting

For our purposes revenue estimation
E:ach of these cantonents
such as on-field

perfonnance

market,

and intensity

of free

agents

indirectly
directly

will,

during

through

(both current

their

marginal

Consider these revenue sources

has been estimated

to attendance

be influenced

and recent

. In addition,

the 1977-83 period

if they provide a turnstyle

obviously related

focuses on AREV, CREV, and BREVL.

to varying degrees,

of fan interest.

reason. 16

past),

size

of · the

the gain and/or

can influence

contribution

by factors

loss

team revenue both

to team performance,

and

draw as "superstars".
in rnore detail.

itself.

in several studies,

AREVand CREV are both

'Ihe basic sports attendance equation
and aspects of our ITOdelare predicated

UJ:X)nthat \o.Ork.17 Fonnally:
( 2)

AREV+cREV = f

[WFCT( +),

COOTENDER(+),

PI'IUJERG(+),
FANS(+),

HIITERG(+),

BBCOOP(-),

CELLAR(-),

Yl981(-),

STADIUM(+),

TSA( +),

TIME(?),

TKBB( +),

SMSA(+),

INCITY(?)];

16
Teams not involved in J:X)St-season play receive no J:X)St-season attendance
or concessions revenue,
while participating
teams receive equal shares for
each game they play. Furthennore, the amounts are sizable.
For the 1969-83
seasons, the ~rld series winners have averaged post-season revenues of approximately two million 1983 dollars. This represents approximately 11 percent
of their total revenue for the year.
A major issue, then, is getting into
the playoffs.
Finishing one game back represents substancial
foregone revenue. In short, a contender may have the greatest incentive to shop in the
free agent market. Not only can a team acquire a proven player, it can also
shop to fill a -weakposition.
'rtle free agent could provide just the marginal
irnprovanent necessary to win the division for an already solid team. While
this is true, estimation of this imtortant revenue impact introduces estimation
difficulties
beyond the scope of the present effort.
Bear in mind, however,
that our retorted revenue incentives will likely understate the revenue impact
of free agents.
Of course, this is also true of all studies in the rent
redistribution
literature
cited in note 4.
17The prototype treatment of this estimation is provided by Noll (1974).
Variations on this thane appear in Scully (1974) and Hunt & Lewis (1976).

12

where parenthetically
effects
that,

on attendance
ceteris

that

note predicted

positive,

negative,

and concessions

revenue.

This specification

we

paribus,

through winning percentage

race.

These affects

less interest

race (CEUAR = l for teams finishing

af feet
slugging

averages

(TSA)

(Yl981) is included
1981 season.

winner; else=

~

0).

when a team is clearly

Similarly,
out o( the

twenty or more games back~ else = 0).

and rower pitching may also attact

on team performance.

relect-

(CONTENDER=1 for teams finish-

ing five or fewer games behind the divisional
fans may show significantly

are roodeled con-

and with a binary variable

(WPCT)

ing whether or not a team is in contention

R:>werhitting

posits

fans turn out to see a winning team, and/or a team

is in the thick of a divisional

tinuously

or indeterminant

These effects

fans independent of their

are

and team strike-to-walk

incorporated
ratios

(TKBB)

thr0t.gh team
18 A binary
•

to allow for reduced revenue fran the strike-shortened

also

which sane observers

include a TIME variable
maintain

has occurred

to test

in baseball

for a secular
attendence

trend

over the

past f 1"f teen years. 19
The addition
At least

of free agents

by design,

they should influence

impact on team performance
But newly acquired
providing

a turnstyle

to a roster

revenue indirectly

(WPCT). More will

"superstars"
draw quite

may also
distinct

can have two revenue effects.

be

through their

said about this

lend an elanent
fran their

shortly.

of theatre,

playing

thus

contribution.

18An analogous situation for individual players was estimated by?, ? who discovered that the most i;:owerful variables for explaining salary differentials
wi9e slugging average for hitters and strikeout-to-walk ratio for pitchers.
Early in the 1970's, there was sane concern that baseball was on the way
out as our national pastime, losing ground to professional
football.
Others
contend that, if this ever was true, interest
in baseball nonetheless has
shown renewed exuberance since the late 1970' s. To capture this possible
trend, TIME is entered quadratically.
13

The free-agent

variables

included

explicitly

PITCHERGand HI'ITERG. These are cunulative
of pitchers

and hitters,

as a three-year

r espec tively.

weighted

average

prior

a quality

measure.

As

we adopt

is

pitchers.

The proEX)rtion of games played

fication

slu;;;ging

of free

average

agents

162 games.

three-year
1975-77)
provide

average
or

reliever

objective,

on a team's

cities

Fingers

estimates

Certainly

an unambiguous

classi-

B11 everyday players,

is simply a full season,
is based UEX)nthe largest

by any starter
1974-76).

( 36,

Mike 'Ibrrez

The resulting

of the potential

of a team's
the
measure

population

indices

impact of free agents

of per capita

market may also
of

of a team's

can (and sane do) canpensate

is our estimate

11

for

20

characteristics

in attendance.
provides

Rollie

continuous

future.

Special

(72,

times

ratio

of baseball's

type

for hitters

is

measure of a player

is a refinement

the denaninator

year

of games played

and strikeout-to-walk

number of appearances

are

acquisitions

0.6 , prior

the quality

hitters

The denaninator

For pitchers,

is

proEX)rtion

into type "C" SEX)tplayers,

and tn;e "A" superstars.
normally

of the

estimation

index value is calculated

of the draft

previously,
for

revenue

of free-agent

F.ach player's

0. 3, and two years

defended

indices

(year

is O.1)

in the

the

metropolitan

attendance

by having particularly

baseball

attendance

explain

base.
rabid

variation
area

(SMSA)

But smaller
FANS. FANS

when the team plays

500

20Along these lines,
it is of interest
to note that the largest
index value
for any pitcher
is 3.03 (Rollie Fingers in the 1976 draft)
while that for
hitters
is for 0.48 (Dave Winfield in the 1980 draft).
The largest
aggregate index values for individual
teams are pitcher gains,
4 .03 ·( California
in the 1980 draft);
pitcher
losses,
3.32 (New York Yankees in 1980); hitter
gains, 1.12 (California
in 1976); and hitter
losses,
1.81 (oakland in 1976).
14

ball. 21

This

attended

annually

observation
per

ranged

resident

of

a second team in a metroi;olitan
base,

especially

baseball

if the other

and ( l + W1:CI'i) of the other
Los Angeles-Anaheim,

may reduce

local

or conversely,

it may take sane years

recent

past.

VE model this

Free-agent

time of negotiation

gains

(New York, Chicago,
STADIUMsize

small stadiun

may

repre~ent

stadium allows

of a new team may wear off after

set

measures

to build

in single
of

interest

with a three-year

<:=entage (WPCT3YR)and the number of pennants

( P3YR).22

cities,

1-5, 6 or m::>re) has an ambiguous

years,

perfonnance

of

the nl.ltl.berof years the team has been

The enthusiasm

the

single-team

of demand, while a larger

on the values

is

A

existence

The impact of other

A team's

case of success.

Finally,

revenue

the

1.5 games

impact of a i;opulation

team two-team cities

on attendance.

Accordingly,

the

as zero for

effect

broadcasting

Yankees to

team is roore successful.

for a given level

(INCITY, taking

the

However,

and San Francisco-Oakland).

a cushion for banner years.

Local

for

Cincinnati.

area

in the extrene

a supply constraint

in the city

0.27

(BBCCMP)is considered

franchises

also be important

fran

allegiances.

or multi-year
are

weighted

several

those
average

won over the past

( PITCHERG, HITIERG) are generally

contracts.

of the

team's

winning perthree

seasons

known at

the

and, as in the case of Pete .R::>se,could be a major factor

21These predictions
resulted
fran a separate
time series
(1969-83) regression for each team.
Per capita attendance,
calculated
as total attendance
for all teams in the metroi;olitan
area divided by SMSA size, was regressed
on winning percentage
(entered
in cubic form) and INCITY (as defined in the
text) • The Cochrane-Orcutt
technique
was anployed to correct
for serial
correlation
in these regressions.
FANS was then calculated
by applying the estimated coefficients
to a breakeven, 500 season instead of actual WPCT and 6 instead of INCITY. FANS provides
a measure of stable
fan interest
over the entire pericd.
It subsumes many
in determining
attendance.
other factors which sane authors deem influential
Included among these are per capita
incane, percent of the population
who
a ~ black, as well as intangible
sports interest.
2~3YR = [.6(WFC'I't-l) + .3(WPCTt_ ) + .l(WFC'I't_ )]/ 3.
2
3

15

in broadcast

revenues.

above should also
is specificed

In addition

influence

the contract.

Thus local

discussed

broadcasting

revenue

as:

+) , P3YR(+)
BREVL= f [WPCT3YR(

( 3)

many of the rnar-ket variables

,

PITCHERG(
+),

HITTERG(
+),

SMSA(+), BBCCMP(-), FANS(+)].

our estimation
dollars)

of season r-evenue (SRE.V, measured in thousands

is then obtained by adding Equations 2 and

expression.

Since

in both equations,
thro~h

least

overlapping

variables

predictions

are unaffected.

squares

as a panel data set.
Orcutt

technique

at 0.82

regression
Serial

of 26.1).

to yield a reduced-form

have the same hypothesized

Equation

(3}

sign

was estimated

by using the 24 teams overt the 15 years

correlation

with the first-order

( t-value

3

of 1983

was corrected
autocorellation

The results

of this

thro~h

the Cochrane-

coefficient
estimation

estimated

are presented

as Fquation (4}.
(4)

SRE.V= -4629.20 + 13.65 WPCT+ 351.50 CONTENDER
- 50.08 CELIAR

(0.58)

(5.30**)

(1.51)

(0.22)

+ 10.21 TSA - 5.19 TKBB+ 75.99 PITCHERG+ 412.53 HITTERG

(2.47**)

(0.01)

(0.51)

(0.81)

- 4775.71 Yl981 - 2137.51 TIME+ 111.24 TIME2 + 0.94 SMSA
(16.69**)
(2.21*}
(3.04**)
(3.56**)
+ 5538.98 FANS- 644.68 BBCa-tP+ 114.31 STADIUM
- 529.39 INCITY

(2.83**)

(0.74}

(4.05**)

(1.65)

+ 324.78 P3YR
+ 14.31 WPCT3YR
(3.39**)
(1.33)

The

2 for this

R

with a single

equation

asterisk

a double asterisk

is 0.64.

depicting

The values
significance

at the one-percent

level.
16

in parentheses

ar-e t-values,

at the five-percent

level

and

Based

to get

on these

involved

on turnstyle
cant.

does an owner have a clear

in the reentry

effect.

standard

revenue

deviation

raises

revenue

to play

by $941,850.

winning?

{5} and (6) .

Before

determinants
standard

of

deviation

in the

future.

length

season's

strikeout-to-walk

Power-hitting

TSA by a standard
revenue

people

could

fewer trips

fran

by $939 , 648,

in $1,143,140.

Pdding
As

to have cost

revenue

appears

10,000

$143,087

position

however.

three
Raising

379 to to 407) should

(SMSA) with one million

unless

more

thos e FANS average
case,

the

$4,775,710

per team in foregone
thro1.ghout

O.17

the team lf.Ould break

onto a stadium
that

in

So are

If.On in the last

observe

17

by its

teams in the area,

an aside,

to have declined

the other

winning

better,

In that
seats

agents

insignificant.

the average

500,

$1 miilion

by another

from other

one

in F.quations

WFCT, a team's

dramatically

to a park in a normal year.

bring

for

of

briefly

three-year
revenue

t-bving to a city

revenue

paribus.

shortly

and the number of pennants

by $285,880.

ceteris

seasonal

increase

a record

percentage

consider

Raising

canpetition

(e.g.,

and carries

however, do free

be examined

controlled

ratio,

deviation

even,

is predicted

should

teams do fare

increase

remains,

(CCNrENDERor CELLAR) appears

of ti.me in the city,

years.

significant

is If.Orth almost

estimation,

revenue.

59 r:oints

race

will

to that

However, having

divisional

a team's

relationship

have the anti-

a team achieving

lf.Ords, it

The question

but insignifi-

truly

the mean winning

In other

turning

the

WFCT is highly

above

500 ball.
This

if free agents

For example,

( 69-points}

569 versus

affect

impact.

incentive

The answer is "no" if one is counting

could be great

impact on WFCT. Note that

a substantial

raise

draft?

revenue

Both PITCHERGand HITIERG are positive,

However, the return

cipated

the

results,

is projected

1981 players'
revenue.

the entire

to

strike
Finally,

period,

but

at a decreasing
is a recent

~

rate.

trend

of rising

r-bw consider

the

OJr model postulates
by the previous

interest

are

HITTERL) that
( 5)

the

however,

national

impact
that

year's

winning percentage)

note,

occur during

agent

gains

percentage

talent

the second half

on field

performance.

(WPCT) is determined

(represented

changes during
and losses

these revenue declines

contracts.

activity

winning

of playing

plus personnel
free-agent

broadcasting

of free

a team's

stock

that offsetting

by last

the off-season.

year's

Of inmediate

(PITCHERG, HI'ITERG, PITCHERL,

of our time perioct. 23

Formally:

WFCT= f [WPCTt-l ( +) , PITCHERG(
+ ) , HITTERG(+) , PITCHERL(-), PLAY'ERL(-)] •

This
following

equation

was estimated

in the

same manner as F.quation

4 with

24

the

results.

23Missing

fran this formulation
are the less accessible
personnel changes retiranents,
rookie additions,
and trades.
If anything,
the exclusion
of
this
information
should bias our estimates
against
free agents affecting
team performance.
The reasoning
is simple.
Teams can attempt to improve
thanselves
in any or all of three ways -- by developing
their · own rookies
throUJh their
farm system, throUJh trades,
or throUJh the reentry
dr-aft.
The coefficients
on free agent gains are estimated
by canparing changes in
winning percentage
of teams actively
involved in the draft
visa vie teams
who are not.
If, as seems reasonable,
teams who are mor-e active in the draft
are a l so less active
in utilizing
the other tv.u modes, then the lack of
adequate control
for the other modes will bias the free agent coefficients
downward.
24

This formulation
differs
fran the production-function
rendering
catm:mly
found in the rent-redistribution
literature.
There, current
performance
such as team batting
is estimated
to be a function of current team aggregates,
average,
slu;Jging average, earned run average,
and strikeout-to-walk
ratio.
An individual's
contribution
to team performance
is then calculated
as their
prorated share of a team aggregate
times that aggregate's
impact on winning.
While this formulation
is appropriate
in calculating
the value of a player's
marginal product,
it is not appropriate
for our purposes.
That is, a newly
acquired
free agent plays in place of another player,
and a free agent lost
is replaced
by a different
player.
~ are
interested
in determining
free
agents' marginal impacts over the other players.

18

(6)

WFCT= 132.46
(7.19**)

+ 0.74 WFCTt-l + 8.66 PITCHERG
+ 20.73 HITIERG

(20.23**)

(1.95*)

(1.18)

- 11.67 PITCHERL- 27.39 HITIERL
(2.20*)
(1.67*)
2

The ·R

for the equation

has neither

is 0.58.

The results

indicate

acquired nor lost free agents starts

this

year

(WPCT

of 500) fran last

of 502).

(WPCT

to improve winning percentage,
ificant

is detrimental

the effects

during the free-agent

to be the best pitcher

of gaining

period.

to enter

has no statistically
or hitters

to the draft

(or losing)

the best pitcher

the draft

and sign with another

of 26 points

club.

and

His

in his new team's winning

(revenue gain of $354,900) but a dec line of 35 points

to his old

team ($477,750).

Dave Winfield,

be the best hitter

of the pericx:1. .Adding a player of his calibre

is predicted

winning percentage

raise

sign-

Rollie Fingers ( 1976 draft) · is estimated

index value of 3.027 implies a rise
percentage

is predicted

To get an idea of the impact on WFCT

to the ensuing season.

and SREV, consider
hitter

but adding hitters

Thus

to remain average

throt.gh the draft

on the other hand, losing pitchers

impact.

fran last year.

year is predicted

Adding pitchers

a team which

out with a winning percentage

of 132 and then adds on 74% of its winning percentage
an average team

that

with an index value of 0.485, appears

by 10 points

to

to a team

($136,500) while his loss

by a team will cost 13 points

($177,450).

the free-agent

fran the revenue equation provide the best point

estimates

coefficients

of their

is predicted

effects.

The turnstile

to have been $230,022 for a total

Dave Winfield's
total

turnstile

While not statistically

direct

of $336,577.

effect

Q'lce again,

on the gate
we

stress

19

significant,

draw of Rollie

revenue increase

is estimated

Fingers

of $584,922.

at $200,077 for a

that such impacts will be under-

stated,

perhaps dramatically,

in getting

their

respective

should these players

have made the difference

teams into the playoffs.

IV. ·surrnary and Conclusions
A

fundamental

baseball's

exists

between the

labor . market and the alternative

The alternative
conduct,

The basis

for this

of violators

prediction

of an implicit

there

must also

had substantial

Our results
ceterius

and, accordingly,

J:efined in this

as an incentive

longer-tenn

a source for cartel

Section

II.

Of

In the case

that

free-agents

have

both for teams gaining

financial

context,
this

canpetitive

revenue effect
auction,

instability.
justify

the spectacular

salaries

In a casual sense, we w::>uldsunnise

Indeed, realization

of this

wealth-maximizing

conduct.

prediction

defections.

for owners to bid in the reentry

of recent years is quite another story.

wisdan of joint

indicate

Furthennore,

However, whether the revenue additions

probably not.

obscures detection

for defectors.

paribus,

balance does appear to have been altered.
can be interpreted

draft

impacts.

is p::,sited as the revenue gains that may be attri-

impacts,

services.

to have canpetitive

the reentry

lure

institutional

Contrary to the

agreement and thus encourages

movements.

revenue

their

is that

paper.

wealth-maximizing

by the league's

is predicted

model of

in this

unique legal status.

be a sufficient

that incentive

buted to free-agent

and losing

by baseball's

rrodel, the reentry draft

of baseball,

model developed

for which is strengthened

and protected

traditional

traditional

view emphasizes joint rather than individual

the rationale

structure

course,

difference

likely

fact

should reaffirm

the

This reasoning

leads us to the

for league conduct which was raised

at the close of

Recall that,

considering
20

the learning

process

that occurs

in

Selected

Measures of Free-.Agent Act ivity

by Draft Year

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

Total Free
.Agents

23

31

29

32

37

36

28

Total Signing
With New Team

22

30

22

27

32

16

16

Total Staying
With Old Team

l

1

7

5

5

20

12

Pct Staying
With Old Team

4%

3%

24%

16%

14%

56%

43%

CUrnulative Index
of Pitchers

8 . 65

13.12

13.00

15. 51

12 . 76

6.05

6 . 70

CUrnulative Index
of Hitters

4 . 47

4.03

2 . 55

3 . 32

5.19

2.58

3 . 02

an in t e r-t emporal game setting,
and intensi t y of free-agent
this

t r end may be occurring

we

hypothesized

a settling

trend in the nature

activi t y .

Sane very preliminary

is presented

in the above table.

evidence

of f r ee agent activity

year of the r eentry

the general

i s for it to rise

ct>serve that

and then subside .

qual ity and quanti t y of activity
agents

signing

aoove are rather
research.

with their

original

.

This trend

Also note the rising
teams .

For example, other rrore revealing
of contracts

negotiated

of directions

presented
for future

of t his fOSSible trend

as well as t he average nunbe r

of teams bi dding and number of bids · per player.
21

in both the

pr opor tion of free

Admittedly , the results

indicies

for each

in the market

is discernable

cursory , but they are suggestive

....ould be the value

trend

that

There , various

measures desc r ibe the quant ity and quality
draft.

1982
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